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Defendant, Carleen Neilson, files a reply brief to
brief of respondent as follows:
I.

THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY
In plaintiff's statement of facts, he asserts his own

testimony as a basis for his factual conclusions without any reference to the court's Findings of Fact.

For example, plaintiff

makes allegations about how the parties came to live together
prior to marriage; defendant's demeanor prior to and during the
marriage; defendant's religious beliefs and intentions; the
pre-marital and marital finances; and, plaintiff's sexual expectations; and defendant's sexual performance, defendant's behavior; and, conclusions about her motives.
dent, pp. 3-10.

See Brief of Respon-

For each conclusion plaintiff relies upon his

own testimony, not the trial court's factual findings to support
his assertions.

Plaintiff ignores defendant's testimony to the

contrary concerning the above allegations.

Since, the

plaintiff's allegations are mere assertions, not part of the
trial court's factual findings, and specifically contradicted by
defendant, such assertions are not properly fact to be relied
upon by this Court.

See Sharf v. BMG Construction, 700 P.2d 1068

(Utah 1985).
Plaintiff makes these allegations for one reason:
establish that he had a bad marriage.

to

This supports his argument

that because he had a bad marriage he should not be held responsible for his obligations under the Prenuptial Agreement.
Whether defendant was a bad marriage is not the issue.
-1-

The issue

is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the Agreement
and correctly applied the law.
A.

The Prenuptial Agreement Did Not "Promote" or "Encourage" Divorce.
Defendant argues that the public policy of Utah pro-

motes marriage; and, that the Agreement violates public policy.
Plaintiff refers to paragraph 9 of the Agreement as a "profiteering" provision.

See Brief of Respondent, pp. 16-20.

In effect,

plaintiff argues that paragraph 9 acted as a financial incentive
for defendant to try to induce plaintiff into filing an action
for divorce by "abandoning the marriage and disregarding the marriage vows," within "an undue short period of time" after the
marriage.

Id. at 18. Plaintiff's cites the following cases to

support his argument:

In re the Marriage of Nogherty, 215 Cal.

Rptr. 76 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1985); and Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio
St.3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984).
The trial court did not find that defendant totally
disregarded her vows shortly after the marriage.

The trial court

found both parties were "totally noncommunicative," "hostile,"
and "did not discuss any marital concerns or problems" with each
other.

(R. 390-91)

Importantly, the trial court found the

defendant did not defraud plaintiff in entering into marriage.
(R. 394, 396). No findings of the court suggest anything malicious, defrauding or calculating on defendant's part.

No find-

ings of the court indicate defendant disregarded her marital vows
shortly into the marriage, any more than that plaintiff
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disregarded his vows to work at making the marriage successful.
Instead, the trial court's factual findings supports the argument
that the marriage was in trouble from the start; and, that both
parties contributed to its failure.

Simply put, there is a world

of difference between what plaintiff claims as justification for
voiding the Agreement (disregarding the marital vows) and irreconcilable differences.

In this case, plaintiff proved irrecon-

cilable differences as grounds for a divorce and nothing more.
The case of In re the Marriage of Nogherty id., support
defendant's argument.
lowing factors:

Nogherty1s holding was based on the fol-

the prenuptial agreement did not define the sep-

arate character of property acquired prior to marriage; the
prenuptial agreement did not deal with property upon death; under
the prenuptial agreement, the wife still got $500,000 or half
regardless of who initiated the divorce; the parties did not seek
legal counsel prior to executing the prenuptial agreement; the
husband testified he did not want to sign the prenuptial agreement; the husband was not a lawyer; and, the parties signed the
prenuptial agreement on the wedding day.

(See In re Marriage of

Nogherty, 215 Cal. Rept. at 153-6.)
In this case the facts and the Agreement are fundamentally different from Nogherty.
page document.

The Agreement consists of a six

The document carefully articulated the community

or separate nature of the parties1 property acquired prior to
marriage, acquired during the marriage, and distributed upon its
dissolution.

See Prenuptial Agreement 111, defining the separate
-3-

nature of the property acquired prior to marriage; Prenuptial
Agreement f6, the Prenuptial Agreement intentionally limits the
rights of both parties to make a claim as to the other's estate;
Prenuptial Agreement 19, defining the community nature of the
stock during the marriage; Prenuptial Agreement 118, defining the
division of property upon death.

Unlike Noqherty, defendant did

not get half of everything if she filed for divorce.

It was only

plaintiff who lost one-half of his stock upon his filing for
divorce.

Furthermore, plaintiff and defendant consulted attor-

neys; and, both agreed to sign the Agreement well before the wedding date.

Lastly, plaintiff was educated in law, a businessman

all his life, and who understood the nature of contracts and the
purpose of the Prenuptial Agreement.

Plaintiff also cites the

case of Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984).

This case

fortifies defendant's position that the Prenuptial Agreement was
upheld even though the party seeking the divorce was provided a
substantial sum in the Agreement if a divorce occurred.

The

dicta of the court cited by defendant refers to plaintiff in this
action.

It is plaintiff who abandoned the marriage and disre-

garded the marriage vow.

He refused to work out problems and

filed for annulment.
Plaintiff ignores defendant's arguments that the
Prenuptial Agreement's language promote a marriage and encourages
the parties to work at resolving any difficulties.

It was in

error for the trial court to make a legal conclusion that the
Prenuptial Agreement encouraged divorce.
-4-

Plaintiff also ignores

the proposition that the trial court must independently construe
the Agreement's language to determine whether it promotes
divorce.

Plaintiff ignores the proposition that the Agreement

did not violate public policy simply because it disproportionately disposes of property upon divorce.

Plaintiff also argues

the fact that the trial court specifically rejected a proposed
finding of fact that stated the Prenuptial Agreement "encouraged
divorce."

The trial court's factual findings and legal conclu-

sions are erroneous because a prenuptial agreement that facilitates divorce (i.e. provides a mechanism for an easier separation
and a definitive division of property) does not violate public
policy.

It is very different than a finding that the Agreement

promoted divorce.

The court refused to make a finding that the

Agreement "encouraged" or promoted divorce.
B.

"Initiate" Means File for Divorce.
1.

Definition of Word.

Plaintiff argues that the word "initiated" in paragraph
9 of the Prenuptial Agreement means "due to the fault of one
party . .' . the other party was forced to file a complaint for
divorce."

See Brief of Respondent, pp. 20-21.

Plaintiff's argu-

ment robs the word "initiated" of its common and usual meaning.
The word "initiated" means to "begin or set going."

See Websters

Third New International Dictionary, p. 1164 (1971).

Initiated

when applied in the context of the Agreement, and when given its
correct meaning, means that plaintiff initiated divorce action
when he filed for annulment; and, was therefore obligated by
-5-

paragraphs 9 and 10.

(See also Rule 3 URCP, a civil action is

commenced by the filing of a complaint.)

Plaintiff filed his

Petition, he commenced the action, he "initiated" the procedure
on petition for dissolution of the marriage.
2.

The Parties' Intent

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court found the
Agreement ambiguous; and, did not reflect the parties1 intent.
For that proposition, plaintiff cites his own testimony at trial.
The trial court did not find the Agreement ambiguous.
The court found that the Agreement did not accurately reflect the
parties1 intentions.

(R. 394). Assuming the Agreement was

ambiguous, it was then the trial court's duty to determine the
parties' intent.

However, as noted above, the Agreement clearly

stated the parties' intent; and consequently, that language was
not ambiguous and the language of the Agreement should govern.
Plaintiff argues he did not initiate an action for
divorce, he initiated an action for annulment which he claims is
conceptionally different.

Plaintiff then argues that because the

trial court, upon its own motion, gave the plaintiff a divorce he
is not obligated under paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement.
Plaintiff's argument taken to its logical end means that even
though plaintiff did not object to a divorce, the trial court
abused its equitable discretion; or, that the parties are still
married.
When the court modified the complaint to assert at
equity the remedy of divorce, plaintiff informed the court he
-6-

wanted to end the marriage.

Previously, and at that time, defen-

dant indicated she did not want to end the marriage; and, under
no circumstances would she counterclaim for divorce.

If plain-

tiff and defendant would have both objected to the trial court's
motion, it would have been an abuse of the court's equitable discretion to dissolve their marriage without finding grounds for
annulment.

Since plaintiff's claim for annulment was denied and

defendant had not counterclaimed for divorce, then the plaintiff
tacitly initiated a divorce (by agreeing with the trial court's
equitable remedy) or there was no dissolution of their marriage.
A court cannot dissolve a marriage unless one party requests a
divorce or an annulment and initiates an action to ohtain that
relief.
3.

The Marriage Itself and Waiver of Mutual Rights
was Sufficient Consideration for the Marriage.

Plaintiff argues that consideration for the Prenuptial
Agreement and the marriage contract failed because the defendant
failed to change her lifestyle after marriage; and that she did
not give plaintiff a "traditional" or "normal marital relationship".

Plaintiff's argument ignores the law, a judge's proper

role in making factual and legal decisions, and the realities of
life.
A prenuptial agreement has vana consideration with a
simple promise to marry.

See Appellate Brief, pp. 18-20.

The

Agreement did not call for a "traditional" or "normal marital
relationship",

Id.

The Agreement only called for the parties to
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marry, which occurred.

For the trial court to void the

Prenuptial Agreement on any other basis or any other claim of
failed consideration, was an abuse of discretion.

Furthermore,

the Agreement called for a mutual waiver of rights, which also
constitutes valid consideration.
As argued previously, it is not the proper role of the
trial court to define what is a "normal marital relationship".
See Appellate Brief of Appellate, pp. 17-20.

For the court to

use its own standards or judgment is simply too subjective.

One

person's definition of a "normal marriage" differs from another's
view.

Indeed, within marriage, partners have differing views as

to what is a "normal marital relationship."
In the 1980s there is no such thing as a "traditional"
marriage because of the changes in social norms.

These changing

social norms truly prohibit any court or individual from coming
up with a definition or absolute standard for a normal marriage.
The trial court abused its discretion when it sought to
define a "normal marital relationship" as the Prenuptial
Agreement's consideration.

The Prenuptial Agreement did not call

for such consideration; and, therefore, the trial court erred as
a matter of law.
4.

The Court Established the Parameters of the Trial
Court's Equitable Power.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have equitable power to disrupt the Prenuptial Agreement.
Respondent, pp. 26-28.

See Brief of

For this proposition, plaintiff cites
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Mathie v. Mathier 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961), and
Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); and numerous
other cases dealing with an unconscionability standard for normal
contracts.

_Id. Plaintiff does not argue that the Prenuptial

Agreement was unconscionable, plaintiff doe$ argue that the trial
court may set aside the Agreement at its own whim based upon some
standard of fairness.

Plaintiff's argument does not address the

proposition that the court should adopt a particular standard for
review of prenuptial agreements.

The current standard for

reviewing contracts is set forth in the Brief of Appellant, pp.
22-24.

Plaintiff fails to address this argument; and fails to

attack the validity of the leading case in this area.
Gant, 328 S.E.2d 106 (W.Va. 1985).

Gant v.

A fairness standard does not

exist anywhere else in contract law; and, it should not exist
with prenuptial agreements.

Contracts are Sacred to the extent

that two parties should be free to enter anlagreement and the
court will enforce its terms. To adopt a fairness standard for
prenuptial agreements would destroy the parties1 ability to contract and virtually guarantee the inconsistent and differing
results (on a case by case basis) when a trj.al court reviews
prenuptial agreements.
5.

Defendant's Conduct was not Contemptual

Plaintiff agrees that the trial ccj>urt erred in holding
the domestic relations commissioner's recommendation was a binding order.

See Brief of Respondent, pp. 29430.
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However,

plaintiff argues defendant was in contempt because she violated a
stipulation.

Id.

Defendant was not in contempt because neither the stipulation nor the commissioner's recommendation were binding
orders.

Plaintiff does not deny that defendant objected to the

commissioner's recommendations; including, the proposed stipulation which was included in the recommendations to restrain the
parties from disposing of marital assets.

The commissioner rec-

ommended a mutual restraining order preventing both parties from
disposing of assets. Defendant properly filed objection and
acted accordingly.

Prior to the trial court's final determina-

tion, plaintiff like defendant disposed of stock.

The trial

court ruled that defendant had violated a commissioner's order
(the commissioner's recommendation); and consequently was in contempt.

(R. 217)
6.

The trial court erred in its ruling.

The Trial Court's Award of Attorneys' Fees was in
Error.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court has great discretion in fixing attorneys' fees in a divorce action.

According to

plaintiff, this discretion includes ordering one party to pay his
or her attorney costs.

For that proposition, plaintiff cites

Morrison v. Peek, 376 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1962).
demonstrate the trial court erred in:

As plaintiff will

(1) ordering her to pay

her own attorney; and, (2) fixing the specific amount she was to
pay.

In Morrison, the Colorado Supreme Court did not address the
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issue of whether it was proper to order one party to pay nis or
her own attorneys' fees.

Rather it defined the issue as follows:

Apparently the trial court was laboring under the impression
that application for attorneys' fees was an order in behalf
of Morrison [the parties' attorney] as against his own client. We do not so construe Morrison's motion. It sought
the entry of "an order" determining th^ fee to which he is
entitled for representing plaintiff in the within
action, . . . .
In that case, the parties settled; and, the husband
agreed to indemnify the wife from liability on a claim filed by
attorney.

Therefore, the attorney brought an action to determine

the fee the husband owed for his wife's attorney.

Consequently,

the Colorado Supreme Court ruled it was appropriate for the trial
court to set the amount of Morrison's fee.

See Morrison v. Peek,

376 P.2d at 60.
That court did not specifically rtpach the issue of
whether it was proper for a court to order one party to pay his
or her own attorneys' fees.

Furthermore, plaintiff ignores

defendant's argument, and decided authority] that it was also an
abused discretion to set the specific amount plaintiff was supposed to pay her attorney.

See Brief of Appellant Carleen

Neilson, pp.29-30.
The court abuses its discretion by ordering a party to
pay his or her attorneys' fees; and, fixing the specific amount
she or he is to pay.

Such a determination interferes with the

private contract between the party and his Or her attorney.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found the defendant did not defraud
plaintiff in entering the marriage contract.

No finding suggests

anything malicious or calculating on defendant's part.

No find-

ing indicates that defendant consciously disregarded her marital
vows.

Instead, the trial court's factual findings only support

the argument that the marriage was troubled from the start; and,
that both parties contributed to its failure.

Simply put, there

is a real difference between what plaintiff claims as justification for voiding the Agreement (disregarding the marital vows)
and irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce.

The case

should be remanded for enforcement of the terms of the Prenuptial
Agreement and for a proper entry of judgment for attorneys' fees
and costs.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ f day of

m^tuJ~~

, 1988.
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